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NEW JERSEY ABOLISHES THE DEATH
PENALTY-IS LEGAL MARRIAGE NEXT?
Justice Harry Lee Anstead*
As the calendar turns to the new year of 2008, two
important legal issues remain the subject of debate among
legal scholars and commentators: the death penalty, which
affects relatively few but nevertheless attracts media
attention, and the changing American family, which affects
millions but goes largely unnoticed except in legal journals.
THE DEATH PENALTY
In early December 2007, New Jersey became the
fourteenth state to eliminate death as a punishment for
premeditated murder or any other crime.' New Jersey's
action was the most recent in a series of events that many
commentators have suggested may eventually lead to the
disappearance of the death penalty in American law.
Perhaps the most notable of recent events concerning the
death penalty took place in Illinois, where the courts
overturned a significant number of convictions and death
sentences. The governor expressed great concern and
appointed a commission to study the state's death penalty
law and process. The commission's recommendations later
served as the basis for the wholesale revision, but not
abolition, of the state's death penalty laws. However, based
upon a perception that the process of determining a capital
defendant's guilt and punishment was unreliable, 'the
governor eventually reduced the death sentences of all Illinois
death row inmates.
In the meantime, a task force of the American Bar
Association examined the application of death penalty laws
Justice, Florida Supreme Court.
1. Assemb. Bill 773, 212th Leg., available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/AlOOO/773_I1.PDF.
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throughout the nation.2 Ultimately, the ABA recommended
that all death penalty states impose a moratorium on
executions in order to carefully scrutinize death penalty law.
Much of the debate over the reliability of the death
penalty process centers around cases where the courts
vacated capital convictions or death sentences based on new
evidence. In many instances, previously unavailable
scientific evidence demonstrated that blood or semen located
at the scene of the crime belonged to a third party and not the
defendant, as previously believed. The scientific community
showed that DNA testing was reliable enough to prove to a
reasonable certainty the source of the blood or semen donor.
Convicted defendants around the country continue to assert
claims of wrongful convictions based on such evidence, and
hardly a month goes by without another long-imprisoned
defendant being released from death row because of DNA
evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also rendered significant
decisions affecting the impact of the death penalty. In a
series of rulings, the Court outlawed the imposition of the
death penalty on juvenile defendants3 and those who were
mentally disabled at the time of the offense.4 Contrary to
many state death penalty schemes, the Court also mandated
that juries, not judges, determine the existence of aggravating
factors that are utilized to support the imposition of death as
a penalty in a particular case.5 The Court is currently
considering the legality of the procedures for administering
the penalty by lethal injection.
With all of this activity questioning the continuing
reliability of the death penalty, many anti-death penalty
interest groups and some commentators have suggested that
the time is ripe for the United States to join the rest of the
civilized world in renouncing the use of death as a
punishment. In fact, the chances for abolition are slim or
none. How could this be?
The reality is that public opinion polls show continuing
2. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Study: State Death Penalty
Systems Deeply Flawed (Oct. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/newsrelease.cfin?releaseid=209.
3. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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support for the penalty6 and, perhaps more importantly,
American politicians continue to enthusiastically embrace the
penalty as a virtual litmus test for electibility, especially in
state legislatures that control death penalty law.
Presidential politics provide an excellent example of this
phenomenon. For example, the current candidates in the
2008 Republican primary have all been eager to demonstrate
their strict views on law and order, or their opponents' lack of
a strict view on the issue. The Democrats have been quieter,
but that could change after the primaries. One need only look
back a few years to the Bush-Dukakis contest and the Willie
Horton ads, as well as Michael Dukakis' hesitant response to
a death penalty question during the debates.7 Subsequently,
candidate and Governor Bill Clinton was alleged to have
allowed a mentally disabled defendant to be executed during
his first presidential campaign rather than face being labeled
soft on crime.' And our current President Bush was obviously
eager during one of his first presidential debates to let the
voters know that Texas, where he served as governor, had an
effective antidote for alleged racist killers: execution.9
No, Virginia, the death penalty is safe and secure in the
United States. In American politics, New Jersey's action
represents the exception and not the rule, and hardly the
beginning of a trend.
What in the world does all this death penalty talk have to
do with legal marriage? Well, first, some background is
important, but the bottom-line may look familiar.
6. See, e.g., Gallup, Death Penalty, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-
Penalty.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) (reporting that sixty-nine percent of
the individuals polled were for the death penalty, and twenty-seven percent
were against it).
7. See Commission on Presidential Debates, The Second Bush-Dukakis
Presidential Debate (Oct. 13, 1988), http'//debates.org/pages/trans88b.html.
8. Bill Clinton supervised the execution of Ricky Ray Rector during the
1992 presidential campaign. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign:
Death Penalty; Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on Governor's Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCEED91F3EF936A15752CO
A964958260.
9. As governor, Bush presided over 152 executions. Sister Helen Prejean,
Death in Texas, in 52 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 1 (2005), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17670.
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THE EVOLVING AMERICAN FAMILY
It is often said that the law is always playing catch-up.
That is, society may change, but the law is usually slow to
recognize those changes until long after they take place. For
example, although drug use outside of alcohol and tobacco has
evolved since the 1960s, the law has been slow to respond.
More specifically, the initial legislative response to any use of
marijuana was harsh and included severe criminal sanctions,
including imprisonment. Over the years, however, society
has become more tolerant of the use of small amounts of
marijuana. But the law has been resistant to this tolerance,
and not until the late twentieth century did state legislatures
begin to lessen or rescind criminal penalties for the personal
use of small amounts of marijuana. The law was slow to
catch up with society's change in tolerance and in the
meantime many lives were permanently altered.
Another example of the law lagging behind societal
changes was demonstrated by the 2005 U.S. Census Report.
The report stated that the proportion of households headed by
married couples in the United States became a minority,
dropping to a historic low of 49.7 percent.10 The composition
of the nuclear American family has now evolved from the
classic couple entering into a marital relationship prescribed
by state law to a de facto relationship existing outside the
legal rules of marriage. The family may look the same, a
couple and one or more children, but that couple has
consciously chosen not to have the relationship legally
sanctioned. Literally millions of people have chosen to
personally tailor their intimate personal relationships to
exclude the blessing of the government. And, while that
choice may appear to have little impact initially, the
consequences of its dissolution often play out with the same
societal costs that are incurred when a legal marriage fails
and the family dissolves.
The debate over what to do about de facto relationships is
framed within an interesting social and legal history. It
appears that the origins of the change in casual drug use and
the changes in the marriage relationship are related to the
same period in this country's history: the late 1950s and the
10. Sam Roberts, To be Married Means to be Outnumbered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct
15, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/us/15census.html.
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two decades thereafter. Perhaps the most dramatic events
taking place during that time include the civil rights
movement and the protests of the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. At the same time, many young people were
reacting to the "establishment" that controlled the law and
the perceived hypocrisy of their parents' generation,
especially regarding the use of alcohol, drugs, and extra-
marital sex. Many young people felt that parents were
preaching abstention while practicing indulgence, which lead
to a generational change towards tolerance of extra-marital
sex and casual drug use.
Another aspect of this perceived hypocrisy was the
rejection by many that a lasting and satisfying relationship
was possible only if it was entered into with the legal blessing
of the state. Young people were beginning to reject the
concept that "a piece of paper," i.e., a marriage license, was
necessary to a successful relationship. Eventually, with a
distinct push from a visible and influential celebrity
community, young people began to see living together and
having children outside the legal marriage relationship as a
valid alternative to the legal norm of a marriage ceremony
with all its trappings. After all, legal marriages obviously
provided no guarantees of happily ever after, since a majority
of those relationships ended in divorce.
So, we find ourselves in 2005 with the majority of
households in the U.S. existing outside the legal marriage
framework provided by the states. With this dramatic turn of
events, it is logical to ask if the law has now caught up with
society, as it has done to varying extents regarding the
personal use of marijuana. But the answer appears to be a
rather resounding "no." In fact, the vast majority of states
still has marriage and divorce laws that look pretty much like
they did in the 1970's. Oh, there have been some changes,
like no-fault divorce, but the statutory law is essentially
unchanged in the vast majority of states. In the eyes of state
legislators at least, legal marriage is still as American as
apple pie, despite the fact that millions of American de facto
marriages, and the families created, are dissolving at the
same high rates endemic to legal marriages. Shouldn't the
health of the American family, legal or de facto, be of
enormous concern to our policy makers in the state
legislatures? Isn't the American family the cornerstone of our
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
society? Where is the concern?
While hardly acknowledging the dramatic shift reflected
in the 2005 census, the courts, still bound by the laws passed
by the legislature, have had to respond to situations when
family issues end up in court. The courts have to take the
cases presented, whether they involve traditional legal
marriages or not. And if one thing is clear, it is that when
humans have relationships problems, which courts will
inevitably have to solve, will naturally follow.
One of the first reported cases involving this new de facto
marriage relationship involved one of the "celebrities"
previously mentioned. In Marvin v. Marvin,1 the California
Supreme Court faced a de facto "wife" who claimed that she
was promised extensive benefits in exchange for entering into
a relationship with the actor Lee Marvin. To a legal
community used to quiet and conservative courts maintaining
the status quo, the court somewhat surprisingly held that the
female partner may have a valid claim based upon implied
contract principles, despite the lack of a legal marriage
relationship. Marvin sowed the first seeds of the judicial
response to defining legal rights that may grow out of a de
facto relationship.
Six years after the Marvin decision this writer, while
serving as a judge on one of Florida's intermediate appellate
courts, was faced with a somewhat similar case, although it
arose in a probate setting after the death of one of the
partners to a de facto relationship. Following Marvin and
distinguishing case law, the Fourth District Court of Appeals
held in Poe v. Levy that valid legal claims based on contract
principles could not be denied solely because they arose out of
a de facto living arrangement that included sexual relations.12
We discussed Marvin as well as a conflicting Illinois Supreme
Court decision 3 that rejected Marvin in favor of strict
adherence to traditional marital law premised on the
establishment of a legal marriage.
Since Poe. there have only been a few Florida decisions
discussing Marvin, and none of those have been by the
Florida Supreme Court. However, there have been a number
11. 18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976).
12. 411 So.2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
13. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
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of cases around the country that have either approved the
Marvin approach, 4 or, like Illinois, rejected it in favor of a
strict adherence to the concept of legal marriage and the
traditional American family.' 5 In fact, many of the judicial
opinions rejecting the Marvin approach often contain rhetoric
not only praising traditional legal marriage as the
cornerstone of American society, but also warning that a
recognition of rights for couples in de facto relationships
would undermine that cornerstone.
Marvin, of course, was limited by its facts and to the
issue of one partner promising support or other compensation
to the other. As demonstrated by the 2005 census, today the
de facto relationship once discussed in Marvin as an
exception now reflects the majority of relationships. Based
upon the numbers, it would not seem extreme to characterize
this change in our culture as truly revolutionary. Those few
young people who disdained a "piece of paper" as the route to
happily-ever-after in the mid-twentieth century have turned
into countless millions who are doing it their way in the
twenty-first century.
In the face of this substantial trend, you might expect a
reaction from state legislatures, the primary policy makers on
family law and relationship issues. There has been some
peripheral activity. In Florida, for example, a recent law
provides for a termination of alimony to a former spouse who
enters into a de facto marital-like relationship with another.16
However, for the most part legislatures have ignored this
trend and continue to pass legislation based on the
assumption that they only have to deal with the traditional
legal marriage and the problems arising there from. For the
most part, there has been more legislative activity on de facto
relationships outside of the U.S. than within it. Canada, the
14. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984); Boland v. Catalano,
521 A.2d 142 (Conn. 1987); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1981); Hay v.
Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J.
1979); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Small v. Harper,
638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594 (Wy.
1981).
15. See, e.g., Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Norton v.
McOsker, 407 F.3d 501 (1st Cir. 2005).
16. FLA. STAT. §61.14 (b) (West 2007) ("The court may reduce or terminate
an award of alimony upon specific written findings by the court that since the
granting of a divorce and the award of alimony a supportive relationship has
existed between the obligee and a person with whom the obligee resides ....").
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United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand all have
legislation providing rights to couples splitting from a de facto
relationship similar to those emanating from legal marriages.
Further, in one important way, state legislatures may
have made dealing with the de facto relationship issue more
difficult, by affirmatively acting to abolish common law
marriage-a concept that had long been part of American
culture, and that actually seems compatible with the current
trend away from formal legal marriage. Today, the vast
majority of states no longer recognize the legal concept of
common law marriage, a marriage premised on the actions of
the partners who treat themselves as married while not
participating in a legal ceremony. Considering that at one
time all states recognized such marriages, this change is
quite dramatic. There is also a certain irony to this trend
since, like ships passing in the night, it clearly preceded and
failed to anticipate the current trend in de facto marriage
relationships reflected in the 2005 census. Arguably, the
demise of the common-law marriage occurred at just the
wrong time, since its existence could have potentially
provided a vehicle to convert de facto relationships into legal
marriages.
The courts, unlike legislatures, have not had the option of
ignoring the trend in de facto relationships. A court must
confront the issue presented, whether it involves property
rights, debt obligations, or child custody. In a case involving
a de facto relationship, regardless of how the court treats the
issues, the parties affected will be impacted in the same way
as parties to a traditional legal relationship: someone will
walk away vindicated, and someone will walk away
aggrieved. In fact, domestic relations and family courts have
their origins in equity and were among the first to be
identified as therapeutic or problem solving courts. In
addition, their success is usually measured by their perceived
ability to deal with the broken or injured relationships
brought to them. Suggesting that unmarried couples with
serious issues to resolve cannot apply for help because they
failed to participate in a brief legal ceremony is hardly
therapeutic.
There are, of course, a number of traditional remedies
available to members of a non-traditional relationship that
parallel remedies available to a traditional family. Child
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custody and support is one example. Virtually all states have
strong public policies in favor of children and laws that back
such policies. For example, either adult in a de facto
relationship can initiate paternity or dependency actions in
most states seeking legal sanction for a declaration
identifying the parents of a child. In that same action, the
court would also have the authority to determine custody and
visitation rights, as well as support obligations of the parents
to the child. In effect, although the father of a child born
outside of the traditional legal marriage may face more
difficulties, the court's approach to issues involving children
is similar to the approach taken in a dispute arising out of a
legal marriage.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said concerning legal
remedies on-mostly economic-issues facing the separating
partners with the break-up of a non-traditional relationship.
While state legislatures have drafted detailed sets of rules
covering property rights and support obligations arising from
the dissolution of legal marriages, no such set of rules exist
for the de facto relationships. When those relationships end
the parties are often left solely with the legal arrangements
that already exist, such as property title or debt obligation.
Any other claims must rest on the undeveloped law growing
out of Marvin and other similar cases that creatively attempt
to apply existing legal and equitable principles to fashion
some relief.
With little response from the legislature, the question
remains whether courts will be more responsive in
recognizing rights growing out of those relationships, rights
that have previously been limited to partners in a traditional
legal relationship. As noted above, however, at least to date
the response to these claims has been mixed, albeit limited.
The American Law Institute, a progressive legal forum that
has attempted to stay up with, if not ahead of, social trends,
has advocated judicial recognition of marital-like rights for
relationships that appear to meet the usual definitions of
marriage except for the absence of formal legal sanction. 17
One state, Washington, appears to have embraced this
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION, 6.03, § 2.2.
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concept even before its articulation by ALI."8 That court has
treated the relationships much in the way common-law
marriages were once treated. That is, if the relationship
looks and acts like a marriage the court has utilized existing
marital law to address the problems presented, financial or
otherwise. But the Washington approach represents a
minority view. Even California, the birthplace of Marvin, has
not gone so far.
There also appears to be little cause to be optimistic
about the state courts' future activism in this area. Courts
are reactive institutions in that they are limited to
considering or reacting only to the cases and issues brought to
them by litigants. On the one hand, this may be good news
for litigants because courts must act on claims asserted,
either by granting or denying relief to the litigant bringing
the action. But courts are very reluctant to change the status
quo. Rather, judges look to constitutions, statutes and
appellate case law already set out. And, while courts in most
jurisdictions retain the authority to recognize rights under
the evolving common law, most of the courts' activity has not
been in the family law area.
Of course, one great exception to that rule has been the
courts' recognition of common law marriage where, ironically,
the trend has been legislative repeal. With the legislative
repeal of common-law marriages, courts are naturally
reluctant to revive the concept in some other manifestation
for fear of being perceived as acting contrary to legislative
intent. After all, legislators have the primary authority to
declare public policy. And, to date at least, legislative public
policy clearly favors the legal marriage relationship over the
de facto relationship. Courts are not entirely free to ignore
that policy.
Many social and legal commentators have also embraced
this public policy favoring legal marriage as being a sound
one for the future of society as well as the partners in the
relationship, and especially their children. These
commentators emphasize the positive and more lasting
impact of the formal and public commitment to the future of
the relationship made by the parties to a legal relationship.
18. See, e.g., Zion Construction, Inc. v. Gilmore, 895 P.2d 864 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1995).
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Others express concern that legal marriages and their
benefits to society may disappear if the same legal
consequences are attached to de facto relationships.
It is important to note that courts have been more active
in other aspects of family law, most notably in the area of
procedure or organization. Most courts, for example, have
been unhappy with the way the traditional adversarial model
works in family law. Courts see the adversarial model as
aggravating conflict in the especially sensitive and emotional
situations presented by family law disputes, and have often
expressed concern too that legal fees and costs take away
from the already limited resources available to families now
forced to support two rather than a single household. Court-
sanctioned mediation has become a popular response to
reduce the level of conflict. Most all states have also adopted
some form of family court designed especially to aid in the
resolution of disputes that involve children. These courts
tend to combine divorce, paternity, domestic violence,
dependency and delinquency cases all in one court division so
that a single judge can attempt to respond to the many causes
and effects present in the breakup that resulted in the need
for outside intervention. These court responses in the family
law area, however, have very little to do with changes in the
substantive law governing the rights and responsibilities of a
couple that chose to live together in a legally unsanctioned
relationship.
One interesting aspect of the emergence of the de facto
relationship as the majority model is the apparent lack of an
identifiable interest group advocating for partners' rights in
the state legislatures. As noted above, while legal
commentators and family law scholars have been active in
writing on all sides of the issue, state legislatures have
largely ignored this trend. It appears that the parties to such
relationships have not been able to sufficiently identify a
shared common interest to pressure legislatures to pass laws
for support rights, and other relevant issues. Instead, this
seemingly "silent majority" has been content to accept their
fate and walk away from relationships with whatever
agreement they reached with their former partners about
property rights, debt obligations, or other issues arising out of
the relationships.
While the issue of the law to be applied to de facto
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relationships has received little public attention despite the
majority status those relationships enjoy, another battle over
marital rights has dominated both the news and the political
landscape. The issue of gay marriage has been confronted in
many states, both in the courts and the legislatures. In
contrast to the debate over de facto relationships, however,
the primary issue in the gay marriage debate has been access
to the legal sanction for marriage provided in state laws. In
other words, gay couples have been vigorously advocating for
their relationships to be legally sanctioned, unlike those
heterosexual partners in de facto relationships who have
chosen not to avail themselves of this available legal sanction.
Hence, as a consequence of the vigorous and concerted
advocacy by the gay community, there has been much more
.activity on the legal front on the gay marriage issue than on
the de facto relationship issue.
The spirited debate over gay marriage may also have
produced some side effects that could ultimately hamper
efforts to have legislatures recognize marital-like rights for
couples in a de facto marital relationship. Many state
legislatures have passed so-called "defense of marriage" laws
restricting legal marriage to heterosexual couples, and some
states have adopted constitutional amendments barring gay
marriage. The issue has also surfaced at the national level
with proposals for a similar amendment to the federal
constitution. Critically, many public officials, including state
legislators, have embraced these laws and constitutional
amendments. Consequently, in the midst of all this political
rhetoric about "defending" legal marriage, it appears unlikely
that the legislators from these same states would embrace
legislation extending marital rights to those in de facto
relationships. Like the rhetoric on the death penalty, support
for the status quo of legal marriage is fast becoming another
litmus test for electibility in many states. Rhetoric over
reason is too often an easy choice in politics. Never mind the
millions of couples that may suffer.
That is not to say that interest groups will not emerge in
support of marital-like rights. In Marvin, for example, the
person bringing suit was a woman who alleged she had been
wronged. Many of the cases that followed Marvin also
involved women plaintiffs. It is possible that the issue could
be framed as a gender problem. Under this scenario, a
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powerful interest group of women's rights advocates could
adopt the cause by suggesting that the lack of legal rules for
the breakup of a de facto relationship result in
disproportionate harm to the women involved. However, not
a lot of hard data has been developed or cited to support such
a contention.
There is also a question of whether the Marvin factual
pattern has become somewhat outdated considering the
variety of de facto relationships that have emerged. In
addition to the apparent common desire for an intimate
relationship, it would appear that both men and women are
forming relationships primarily for mutual economic benefits,
and are doing so in an endless variety of arrangements as to
rights and responsibilities. In fact, the variations in these
relationships may be a major stumbling block in the adoption
of a set of uniform legal rules to govern the relationship and
its dissolution. A young couple faced with significant living
costs in a big city may find it convenient to live together in a
single apartment, while otherwise keeping their financial
lives completely separate. If they stick to this financial
discipline, they may have little to dispute if they separate a
few years later. On the other hand, an older couple facing the
same financial challenges may commit to a longer term
relationship and face different issues if the relationship is
terminated unexpectedly by death. An endless list of factors
may come into play in the relationship, including length,
division of financial responsibilities, personal and real
property ownership, children, insurance, and estate and
retirement planning. In other words all the issues facing an
individual in life may be carried over into a relationship. It is
this endless variety of issues and arrangements that may also
prevent the partners from forming a unified front or interest
group in advocating for particular legal change. Of course,
the same variety of issues also faces couples separating in a
legal marriage.
A serious question also exists regarding how responsive
the law should be when couples voluntarily choose not to
enter into an available legal marriage relationship with all of
the legal consequences attached. Does it make sense to
develop a mandatory legal code for such persons when they
intentionally chose to enter into a relationship without such a
code? Having consciously chosen not to be bound by the
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marital and dissolution law applicable to legal relationships,
why would such persons want such a code imposed upon
them? Further, having made such a choice, why should such
partners not be held responsible for the consequences of not
protecting themselves in case of a breakup? After all, even
with legal marriage, planning for the future in all its possible
forms is encouraged. In fact, premarital agreements-a
remedy already in widespread use among legally married
couples-may constitute a partial solution that does not
require legislative sanction. Prenuptial agreements may
work even better in de facto relationships than in legal
marriages. The legal system generally, and courts in
particular, look with favor upon voluntary agreements
between adults. In addition, considering the endless variety
of reasons couples enter into relationships, the flexible nature
of a pre-relationship agreement may be ideal to capture the
intent of the parties, both during the relationship and in
contemplation of its dissolution.
CONCLUSION
One can speculate that all courts, much like Washington
courts and the California Supreme Court, may ultimately be
persuaded that the sheer force of numbers reflected in the
2005 U.S. Census Report requires a judicial response. The
nature of such a response then becomes the question. Most
legal commentators and scholars have pointed to the legal
framework applied by other countries, similar to the set of
draft principles adopted by the American Law Institute, to
provide guidelines for courts to identify a relationship as a de
facto marriage. And, as noted above, while no state high
court has adopted the ALI draft principles, some state courts,
like Washington, have already embraced similar principles.
Based upon the limited response of the courts to date,
however, it is far more likely that the parties to such
relationships will have to continue to make do with
traditional legal remedies creatively advocated to serve as a
basis for relief.
We can safely assume that in today's political
atmosphere neither the death penalty nor legal marriage is in
any serious danger. But while the debate over what to do
when unmarried couples decide to separate may not be
capturing the headlines in the way the death penalty does,
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with millions of lives affected the debate is not likely to go
away. The question is whether legislators will continue to
ignore the trend toward de facto marital relationships while
proclaiming support for legal marriage, or whether there will
be some serious legislative effort to deal with an issue whose
time appears to have arrived. Only time will tell. One thing
is certain, however, the myriad of problems created when
couples in de facto relationships separate will inevitably be
brought to the courts for resolution. Who knows whether
somewhere out there a draft opinion is already circulating
that provides a wise and comprehensive resolution to this
vexing issue.

